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This article investigates how precisely short-term, job search-oriented training programs as opposed
to long-term, human capital intensive training programs work. We evaluate and compare their effects on
time until job entry, stability of employment, and earnings. Further, we examine the heterogeneity of
treatment effects according to the timing of training during unemployment as well as across different
subgroups of participants. We find that participating in short-term training reduces the remaining time
in unemployment and moderately increases job stability. Long-term training programs initially prolong
the remaining time in unemployment, but once the scheduled program end is reached participants exit to
employment at a much faster rate than without training. In addition, they benefit from substantially more
stable employment spells and higher earnings. Overall, long-term training programs are well effective in
supporting the occupational advancement of very heterogeneous groups of participants, including those
with generally weak labor market prospects. However, from a fiscal perspective only the low-cost short-
term training schemes are cost efficient in the short run.
Keywords: Training, Program Evaluation, Duration Analysis, Dynamic Treatment Effects, Multiple
Treatments, Active Labor Market Policy
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1. INTRODUCTION
Job training programs are the core of active labor market policy in most advanced countries. They
aim at integrating the jobless and economically disadvantaged into the labor market. Countries
like the USAand Germany have been operating training policies for many decades.Yet the success
of different approaches—in particular, human capital development as opposed to work-first
strategies—remains a controversial issue. Long-term, human capital intensive training schemes
provide comprehensive instruction in occupational skills. While they focus on improvement in
the productivity of the unemployed, they usually do not aim at rapid reemployment. Moreover,
they are relatively expensive. In contrast, job search assistance programs comprise job readiness
training and instruction in job search skills. They are based on the idea that occupational skills
are best acquired on the job. Consequently, they focus on quick job entry. A major advantage is
their low cost. This approach has been emphasized in policy reforms implemented in 1996 in the
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USA and the late 1990s to early 2000s in other advanced countries.1 However, the limited set of
skills provided may not be sufficient to address structural mismatch and to improve employment
stability in the long run, a compelling concern in view of sweeping shifts of labor demand that
disadvantage less-skilled workers.2 After the sharp downturn of the 2008/2009 recession, many
economists call for an expansion of public sponsored training programs to combat increasing
rates of long-term joblessness among less-skilled persons.3
What is the best design of job training for the unemployed and the economically
disadvantaged? This article sets out to investigate how precisely short-term, job search-oriented
training and long-term, human capital intensive training programs work. We examine and compare
their effects on time until job entry, stability of employment, and earnings within a unified
framework. For this purpose, we model the full path of transitions between different labor market
states and training programs over time. Our dynamic approach has several important advantages
over conventional static research designs. First, we are able to net out differential changes in the
composition of treatment and comparison group persons over time. This is necessary in order
to separately assess the impacts of training on unemployment and employment spells and to
obtain impact estimates on employment stability and wages that are not biased by systematic
differences between treated and comparison persons who take up a job. Second, we are able to
exactly align treated and comparison persons with respect to their prior unemployment experience
and calendar time.4 Thus, we avoid that for example, differences in labor market conditions upon
reemployment confound employment impacts of training. Third, our continuous-time framework
avoids specification issues that arise as a consequence of aggregating along the time dimension.
A dynamic approach is also necessary because in many countries with comprehensive active
labor market policies, like in our case of Germany, program assignment is not a static, one-time
event. Rather, it is a recurring decision that is dynamically related to the success of job search.
Job-seekers with longer unemployment spells are more likely to end up receiving treatment
because they have been exposed to the assignment process for a longer period of time.5 We
therefore explicitly specify the accumulation of information over time and model the dynamic
process of treatment assignment jointly with the transitions between labor market states. This
strategy allows us, in addition, to analyze the effect of the timing of program participation during
unemployment—an important dimension of effect heterogeneity that has been neglected in the
literature so far.
Further, we investigate the heterogeneity of treatment effects not only according to the timing
of training during unemployment but also across different subgroups of participants. In particular,
we examine how different occupational groups fare with the two training programs. This allows
us to address the question whether job training programs are an effective tool to mitigate the
1. See e.g. Blank (2002); European Commission (2002); OECD (2005, ch. 4; 2006) and section B.2 in the
Supplementary Appendix.
2. See e.g. Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008), Dustmann, Ludsteck, and Schönberg
(2009) and Spitz-Oener (2006) for evidence on long-term shifts in the structure of wages and employment especially in
the USA and Germany.
3. See e.g. Elsby, Hobijn, and S¸ahin (2010) and the accompanying comments as well as the article “America’s
Jobless Men—Decline of the Working Man” in The Economist, 28 April, 2011.
4. Ashenfelter (1978); Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997); and Heckman and Smith (1999), among others,
stress the importance to carefully align treated and comparison persons with respect to their pretreatment outcomes.
5. See Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), for a formal analysis of dynamic program starts. A similar situation
arises if there is a delay between the moment of (random) assignment and program start. Some persons may drop out
of the treatment group before the start of the intervention because they already found a job on their own, see Heckman,
LaLonde, and Smith (1999) for evidence of substantial dropout rates in major US social experiments. Abbring and van
den Berg (2005) formally analyze the value of randomization at some baseline point if actual enrolment in treatment is
dispersed over time.
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negative effects of structural labor demand shifts. We give a detailed picture of the dynamics of
training impacts, provide summary statistics of overall impacts, e.g. in terms of mean and median
outcomes, and conduct a cost-benefit assessment. We thus provide an exceptionally detailed
account of these two widely used active labor market programs. Such evidence is important in
order to optimally allocate existing training programs and to devise new, improved schemes.
To provide the conceptual backdrop for our empirical analysis, we introduce a novel dynamic
potential outcome framework based on the theory of continuous-time counting processes. We
formally describe the dynamic relationship between treatment times, potential, and actual outcome
times based on the notions of past, present, and future. We formulate the assumptions needed to
solve the evaluation problem in a dynamic setup in which the conditioning events are sequentially
updated over time. We then develop our dynamic causal model as a semi-Markov process for the
transitions between the different labor market states and training programs. In this way, we are
able to extend the timing-of-events approach by Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) to a setting
that involves sequential updating of information, multiple treatments (short-term and long-term
training), multiple outcomes (unemployment duration, employment duration, and earnings), and
treatment effects that depend in a general way on the past unemployment experience, the treatment
time, observed covariates, and unobserved heterogeneity.
Our identification strategy relies on the conditional no-anticipation and independence
assumptions as well as on results from the literature on mixed hazard rate models. Under the
conditional no-anticipation assumption, the current unemployment outlook is the same for any
two potential outcomes associated with different future treatment times conditional on time-
constant unobservables, the elapsed unemployment experience, and the covariate history up to the
current time. Under the conditional independence assumption, the current unemployment outlook
of potential outcomes associated with different treatment times is conditionally independent of
treatment decisions taken up to the current time. Taken together the two assumptions can be
interpreted as conditional sequential randomization into treatment. The combination of three
factors makes them a credible basis for causal analysis in our case. First, we focus on a homogenous
sample of job-seekers with a continuous prior employment record. Second, we exploit that the
allocation of training programs is driven by the short-term supply of training slots as well as
private information of the caseworker. Third, we adopt a flexible modeling strategy that relies
on large sample sizes, repeated observations per person and a rich set of time-constant as well as
time-varying covariates.
Under conditional no-anticipation and independence, we can then study identification of
the joint distributions needed for causal inference on training impacts. Specifically, we view
the successive transitions from unemployment and employment as a sequence of competing
and single risks models with lagged occurrence dependence and lagged duration dependence
in the higher order transition rates. We apply results from the literature on duration models
with proportionate unobserved heterogeneity in the hazard rates, dependent competing risks,
and lagged duration dependence (e.g., Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b; Brinch, 2007;
Honoré, 1993; Horny and Picchio, 2010). Hence, our estimated treatment effects are identified
semiparametrically. Our large and exceptionally informative data allow us to dispense with some
important functional form assumptions that are typically made in the literature and to adopt a
rich and flexible modeling strategy. In particular, we exploit that we observe repeated realizations
per person and time-varying covariates.6 Thus, we are able to overcome important limitations of
existing evaluation studies using duration methods for program evaluation.
6. With these data features, identification only relies on separability of the hazard rate in the unobserved
heterogeneity term.
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The empirical analysis in this article uses unique administrative data for Germany. Germany
is an interesting case to study because its recent reforms and developments in the field of labor
market policy closely follow the recommendations formulated in the international policy debate
in the mid-1990s in view of high unemployment levels especially in the European countries
(cf. European Commission 2002, on the “European Employment Strategy” and OECD, 2006,
on the “OECD Jobs Strategy”). Average public spending on active labor market policies per
unemployed relative to per capita GDP in the years 2000 and 2001 is around 33% in Germany
which is at the mean across OECD countries (OECD, 2006, ch. 7).7 Traditionally, long-term,
human capital development-oriented training programs dominated active labor market policy in
Germany. Since the turn of the millennium, short-term, job search-oriented training programs
have gained in importance.8
Our main findings are as follows. Participating in short-term training reduces the remaining
time in unemployment and has moderate positive effects on subsequent job stability. Long-term
training programs initially prolong the remaining time in unemployment. However, once the
scheduled program end is reached participants exit to employment at a much faster rate than
without training. Moreover, they benefit from substantially more stable employment spells and
higher earnings. Further, our findings point to the possibility of improving the efficiency of long-
term training programs through a careful targeting. Specifically, we find that the opportunity cost
of participating in terms of prolonged unemployment is lower for people with lower chances to
exit unemployment on their own, e.g. long-term unemployed and low skilled. Persons without
formal education degree and persons previously working in low- and medium-skilled manual
occupations reap particularly high gains with respect to earnings. Persons previously working
in medium-skilled analytic and interactive jobs show substantial gains in terms of employment
stability. Overall, long-term training programs are well effective in supporting the occupational
advancement of very heterogeneous groups of participants, including those with generally weak
labor market prospects. However, from a fiscal perspective only the low-cost short-term training
schemes are cost efficient in the short run. In light of the recent policy shifts favoring short, job
search-oriented training programs a more balanced use of both types of training seems warranted.
In fact, while the shorter programs may appeal for their cost efficiency the longer programs seem
more effective in tackling structural deficits.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section discusses related
literature in the field. Section 3 lays out our evaluation approach and Section 4 describes the
implementation. Section 5 presents our causal estimates of training impacts, and Section 6
concludes. Sections A through I in the Supplementary Appendix contain further information
on the identification analysis, the institutional context, the data source, descriptive evidence, the
variables used in the estimation, and the estimated models.
2. RELATED LITERATURE
The literature on microeconometric evaluations of job training programs has been growing rapidly
since the late 1990s as the political demand for rigorous scientific evaluations of labor market
programs increased also in the continental European countries. Evidence reviewed in various
surveys and meta-analyses e.g., by Heckman et al. (1999); Greenberg, Michalopoulos, and Robins
(2003); Kluve (2010); and Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010) suggests that human capital intensive
training programs show modestly positive effects in the medium run, with the percentage gain in
7. The corresponding figure is 7% for the USA, and 51% for Sweden.
8. See section B.2 in the Supplementary Appendix.
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employment generally exceeding that in earnings. Job search assistance programs yield favorable
employment effects in the short run. In the following, we highlight evaluation studies that are
most closely related to ours.
We start with studies applying experimental or matching methods. The vast majority of
evaluation studies analyzes short- to medium-term outcomes of job training programs, which may
bias findings toward a more favorable assessment of shorter programs, such as job search training,
compared with longer ones. A few studies investigate long-term impacts, among them Couch
(1992) and Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2006) for the USA as well as Fitzenberger, Osikominu,
and Völter (2008) and Lechner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2011) for Germany. Their results suggest
that, although positive effects of human capital intensive training appear only with a delay, they
persist over periods as long as eight or nine years. Hotz et al. (2006) and Dyke et al. (2006)
study the differential effects of training programs aiming at human capital development and job
search assistance, respectively, in the USA. They find that job search assistance programs improve
employment prospects in the short run, whereas more intensive training programs initially lead
to employment and earnings losses. Over the longer term, human capital intensive training tends
to be more effective than job search assistance.
While experimental and matching estimators that closely mimic the experimental design are
appealing for their straightforward interpretation, they also have some limitations. As argued
above, the experimental setup is inherently static and does not take into account the dynamics
of program assignment and of labor market outcomes.9 In order to better study the labor market
dynamics associated with program participation some researchers have used event history models
to evaluate training programs. The earlier duration literature—notably Gritz (1993), Ham and
LaLonde (1996) and Eberwein, Ham, and LaLonde (1997) for the USA and Bonnal, Fougère,
and Sérandon (1997) for France—focuses on modeling the dynamic selection into different
labor market states. While in Ham and LaLonde (1996) training is randomly assigned to a
stock sample of eligible persons, Gritz (1993), Bonnal et al. (1997), and Eberwein et al. (1997)
jointly model transitions into program states and outcome states. This early duration literature
conceives program participation as a separate labor market state and models treatment effects
with an indicator for past program participation in subsequent transition rates. These studies find
mixed effects on subsequent unemployment spells and mostly positive impacts on subsequent
employment spells.
More recently, Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) develop an econometric framework to
jointly analyze dynamically assigned programs and the probability of survival in a baseline state.
They prove identification of dynamic treatment effects that depend on observed covariates and
either the elapsed time since treatment or unobserved heterogeneity.10 Compared with the early
duration literature the more recent timing-of-events approach explicitly models the dynamics
of program starts. Assignment to program and exit from the baseline state are viewed as two
competing risks. If exit from the baseline state occurs first, the waiting time until treatment is
censored. Conversely, if assignment to treatment occurs first, the exit rate from the baseline
9. There exist a number of intermediate strategies between a fully dynamic approach and a completely static design.
Matching estimators have been adapted to account for dynamic program assignment, see e.g. Sianesi (2004, 2008); Dyke
et al. (2006); Fitzenberger et al. (2008). Other approaches combine matching with dynamic outcomes such as transition
rates and survival times, see e.g. Bergemann, Fitzenberger, and Speckesser (2009) and de Luna and Johansson (2010).
See Abbring and Heckman (2007), Abbring and van den Berg (2004), and Crépon, Ferracci, Jolivet and van den Berg
(2009) for a methodological overview and comparison of different evaluation approaches.
10. Richardson and van den Berg (2006) extend the timing-of-events approach proving identification of dynamic
treatment effects that are a proportional function of time since treatment, observed covariates and unobserved
heterogeneity. Abbring (2008) develops a framework based on mixed proportional hazard rate models that involves
multiple baseline states and competing destination states.
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state may change as a consequence of the treatment. In addition, the timing-of-events approach
highlights the importance of no-anticipation of future treatments for identification. Our dynamic
causal model is similar to that of Abbring and van den Berg (2003a), but we use a counting
process framework to describe the current evolution of potential outcome processes with respect
to past and future treatment events. We adapt the conditional no-anticipation and independence
assumptions to a setting in which the conditioning events are sequentially updated over time.
Further, we consider multiple types of treatments and multiple outcomes as well as treatment
effects that depend in a general way on the past unemployment experience, the treatment time,
observed covariates, and unobserved heterogeneity.
A small literature applies the timing-of-events approach to evaluate occupational training
(Crépon, Ferracci, and Fougère, 2012, for France; Lalive, van Ours, and Zweimüller, 2008, for
Switzerland, Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss, 2006b, for Germany, and Richardson and van den Berg;
2006, for Sweden) or active job search programs (Crépon, Dejemeppe, and Gurgand, 2005, for
France; Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss, 2006a, for Germany; and Weber and Hofer 2004a,b, for
Austria). The vast majority focuses on impacts on the duration in the initial unemployment spell,
only Crépon et al. (2005) and Crépon et al. (2012) also study unemployment recurrence. The
evidence in these studies suggests that job search training reduces unemployment duration, while
more intensive training programs tend to increase it. Crépon et al. (2005) and Crépon et al. (2011)
find that both program types have a beneficial effect on unemployment recurrence.
A major advantage of our study is its exceptionally large and informative administrative
data. Thus, we can relax important functional form assumptions that are typically made in
the duration literature. We adopt a flexible modeling strategy and provide a detailed account
of job search-oriented and human capital intensive training with respect to the outcomes
unemployment duration, employment duration, and earnings. As a further contribution, we
examine the heterogeneity of treatment effects across a range of important observed characteristics
such as education and occupation.
3. EVALUATION APPROACH
3.1. Dynamic potential outcome framework
Consider the following setup. People can either be unemployed or employed. While unemployed,
they may be assigned to a training program. In particular, the job-seeker and the caseworker at the
local employment agency meet repeatedly during the unemployment spell. At any such occasion,
the caseworker decides whether to assign the job-seeker to a program or to postpone participation
to the future, waiting further how job search evolves. Somebody who has not participated, say,
until Day 80 of his unemployment spell may still enrol later. If, however, he starts a new job
at Day 81 he would not be eligible for participation anymore. Thus, a job-seeker in open, i.e.,
untreated, unemployment is exposed to two risks that compete to end open unemployment: start
of a training program and start of a new job. How can we evaluate the effect of participating in
training on the duration of unemployment in this setting?
We adopt a continuous-time version of the potential outcome approach to program evaluation
(Neyman, 1923; Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1974).11 The different starting times of training during
unemployment represent a continuum of mutually exclusive treatments s∈R+∪{∞}. s=∞
corresponds to the case that training never starts. We denote by T∗(s)∈R+ the potential
duration in unemployment until exit to employment that prevails if training starts at time s of
11. See Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) and Lok (2008) for related approaches in continuous time. Abbring and
Heckman (2007) provide an overview of different dynamic evaluation approaches.
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unemployment.12 Let T ∈R+ be the actual unemployment duration. For training starting at s, the
actual outcome time is identical to the potential outcome time associated with s, i.e., T ≡T∗(s),
whereas the other potential outcome times T∗(s′), s′ =s, are counterfactual.
We express the random time spent in unemployment as a continuous-time stochastic process.
This will allow us to formally describe how past and future treatment times affect the current
unemployment outlook conditional on the information accumulated until the current period. Let u
denote the elapsed time since the beginning of unemployment. The actual unemployment duration
T generates a counting process Y ≡{Y (u),u∈R+} such that Y (u)=0 if u≤T and Y (u)=1 if
u>T . Analogously, we denote the counting process associated with the potential unemployment
duration T∗(s) as Y∗(s)≡{Y∗(s,u),u∈R+} such that Y∗(s,u)=0 if u≤T∗(s) and Y∗(s,u)=1
if u>T∗(s).13 Further, let dY (u) be the differential of Y (u) in a small interval [u,u+du). Let
u− denote the time just before u. The probability that an exit to employment occurs in the
small interval [u,u+du) conditional on survival in unemployment until just before u is given by
Pr(dY (u)=1|Y (u−)=0)=Pr(T ∈[u,u+du)|T ≥u)≡θ (u)du, where θ (u) denotes the hazard rate
or intensity process. In order to model this probability conditional on the information available up
to the current period, we introduce the filtration I(u−) that collects the information accumulated
until just before u. Let {x(u),u∈R+} be a vector-valued stochastic process of time-varying random
variables and v a vector of time-constant random variables.14 While x(u) represents covariates that
can be observed by both the job-seeker and the researcher, v is not observable for the researcher.
Now I(u−) is defined as σ {Y (r),x(r),v,0≤r <u}, where σ {} is the σ -algebra generated by the
events {Y (r),x(r),v,0≤r <u}. Y has an intensity process with respect to the filtration I(u−) if
θ (u|I(u−)) is predictable given I(u−) and, thus, the conditional expectation of dY (u) equals
the conditional intensity process times the increment of u: E[dY (u)−θ (u|I(u−))du|I(u−)]=
Pr[dY (u)=1|I(u−)]−θ (u|I(u−))du=0.
Our goal is to contrast the marginal distributions of potential outcome times associated with
different treatment times. In particular, we want to evaluate the effect of starting training at s
instead of s′ for those who enrol at s. The potential outcome distribution associated with starting
training at s′ is counterfactual for those who enrol at s. In order to solve the evaluation problem
we rely on two assumptions. As only unemployed persons are eligible for training the treatment
times are censored for people who find a job before starting training. Therefore, we assume
that conditional on the information accumulated up to just before u the probability of an exit to
employment in a small interval [u,u+du) is the same across potential outcomes associated with
different treatment times that lie after u. Formally, for any two potential outcome processes Y∗(s)
and Y∗(s′) that have intensity processes with respect to the filtration I(u−)≡σ {Y (r),x(r),v,0≤
r <u}, we suppose that:
(Conditional No-Anticipation) (1)
Pr[dY∗(s,u)=1|I(u−)]=Pr[dY∗(s′,u)=1|I(u−)] ∀u≤min(s,s′).
Under the conditional no-anticipation assumption (1), the current probabilities of survival in
unemployment for any two potential outcome processes associated with different future treatment
times coincide. Hence, we can study the distribution of the observed unemployment process given
12. We assume that all potential outcomes {T∗(s),0≤s≤∞} are absolutely continuous random variables.
13. We assume that all counting processes are right-continuous and have limits on the left.
14. We suppose that the process {x(u),0≤u} is left continuous and that v is bounded.
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that training has not yet started to recover the potential unemployment process without training
(s=∞).15
Second, we assume that conditional on the history of information available just before u
the potential outcome processes are independent of the treatment history up to u. Formally, the
random waiting time in unemployment until the start of training induces a counting process D≡
{D(u),u∈R+∪∞} such that D(u)=0 if u is smaller or equal to the treatment time and D(u)=1
else. Denote the σ -algebra generated by the treatment process as σ {D(r),0≤r <u}. We suppose
that the potential outcome process Y∗(s) has an I(u−)-predictable intensity process that is also
the intensity process of Y∗(s) with respect to the extended filtration J (u−)≡I(u−)∪σ {D(r),0≤
r <u}, i.e.:
(Conditional Independence) (2)
Pr[dY∗(s,u)=1|J (u−)]=Pr[dY∗(s,u)=1|I(u−)] ∀s.
While assumption (1) characterizes the evolution of current potential outcomes associated
with future treatment times, assumption (2) refers to the relationship between current potential
outcomes and past treatment events. Taken together the two assumptions can be interpreted as
sequential randomization into treatment conditional on the information available up to the time of
randomization. They are comparable with sequential conditional unconfoundedness assumptions
invoked in sequential matching approaches (e.g., Lok, 2008; Robins, 1998; Sianesi, 2004),
except that we allow the conditioning set to include time-constant unobservables. Importantly,
assumptions (1) and (2) do not rule out that job-seekers can in general predict the probability
of receiving training at particular points in time. Moreover, their predictions may be based on
information acquired during the course of unemployment. Assumptions (1) and (2) just require
that the researcher can control for all events that jointly predict treatment and outcome times. In
addition, after conditioning on all relevant information, treatment assignment still needs to be a
stochastic process.16 In Section 3.3, we substantiate the empirical support of assumptions (1) and
(2) in our application.
By assumptions (1) and (2), we can link the potential probability of an exit to employment at
time u to the actually observed probability:
Pr[dY∗(s,u)=1|I(u−)]=Pr[dY∗(s,u)=1|J (u−)]=Pr[dY (u)=1|J (u−)].
Thus, we can conduct inference on the potential unemployment processes associated with
different treatment times by studying the properties of the actually observed unemployment
processes conditional on the respective treatment times. Further, we can express the actual
outcome process and the treatment process as three underlying processes that are independent
15. Without the conditional no-anticipation assumption, we could only identify the average of pretreatment potential
outcomes with respect to the distribution of future starting dates.
16. Abbring and van den Berg (2003a) also rely on versions of the conditional no-anticipation and independence
assumptions. Translated into our notation, their no-anticipation assumption states that Pr[dY∗(s,u)=1|H(u−)]=
Pr[dY∗(s′,u)=1|H(u−)] ∀u≤min(s,s′), where H(u−)≡σ {Y (r),0≤r <u,x(0),v}. Thus, they abstract from the
possibility that the current transition probabilities of potential outcomes associated with different future treatment times
depend differentially on events occurring between the start of unemployment and the current period. Translated into our
notation, their conditional independence assumption states that the potential outcome processes, {Y∗(s),s∈R+∪∞}, are
independent of the treatment process, D, conditional on the information available at time zero, I(0)≡σ {x(0),v}. This
assumption abstracts from the possibility that events occurring during the course of unemployment may jointly influence
potential outcome times and treatment times.
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conditional on J (u−). The first component process tracks the transition from open unemployment
to employment, the second the transition from open unemployment to treatment and the third
the transition from treated unemployment to employment. Thus, the waiting times in open
unemployment until the start of training and until exit to employment are two competing risks.
Identification of the joint distribution of the waiting times is nontrivial because we allow all three
to depend on the unobserved heterogeneity v. We rely on results from the literature on mixed
hazard rate and competing risks models. We describe the full model, that includes two types of
training programs, and its identification in Section 3.2.
Further, we want to study the impact of training on the stability of subsequent employment.
We extend our framework as follows. Let K(u) be the state occupied at time u since inflow into
unemployment. K(u)=U if unemployed and K(u)=E if employed at time u. The transition from
origin state k to destination state l, can be modeled as a continuous-time semi-Markov process.
Analogously to above, let Tkl ∈R+ denote the random time spent in state k until exit to state l and
Ykl the corresponding counting process that tracks the transition from state k to state l. Similarly,
Y∗kl(s) denotes the potential outcome process for the transition from state k to l prevailing if
training starts at time s of unemployment. The probability that a transition from k to l occurs in
a small interval [u,u+du) is given by Pr[dYkl(u)=1|Ykl(u−)=0,K(u−)=k]=Pr[K(u+du)=
l|Tkl ≥ t,K(u−)=k], where t is the elapsed duration in the current state k.
With some small modifications, assumptions (1) and (2) carry over to the extended
setup. In both equations, substitute Y∗kl for Y∗. The filtrations are now defined as I(u−)≡
σ {Ykl(r),x(r),v;0≤r <u;k,l∈{E,U},k = l} and J (u−)≡σ {Ykl(r),D(min(r,TUE)),x(r),v;0≤
r <u;k,l∈{E,U},k = l}. Further, we assume that the conditional no-anticipation assumption (1)
holds for all u≤min(s,s′) if K(u)=U and for all s,s′>TUE if K(u)=E. Thus, the survival
experience is the same for potential employment processes associated with different treatment
times that have not been realized during the preceding unemployment spell. Under assumptions
(1) and (2), we can recover the potential employment processes associated with different treatment
times from the actual employment process conditional on the respective treatment times. Hence,
we view our dynamic causal model as a semi-Markov process that involves a competing risks
model for the waiting times in open unemployment until exit to employment and training, and
single risk models for the transitions from treated unemployment to employment as well as from
treated and nontreated employment to unemployment. In addition, we consider a second model
with earnings instead of employment duration. In this case, we model the conditional distribution
of earnings as a hazard rate together with the hazard rates from unemployment into training and
into employment.17 We describe our setup and the identification in detail in the next section.
3.2. Identification with proportionate unobserved heterogeneity
We now describe our empirical setup that comprises two treatments i.e., short-term training and
long-term training, and two outcomes i.e., the duration until reemployment and the duration of
subsequent employment or the level of subsequent earnings in terms of a continuous-time semi-
Markov process. We then discuss identification of our model based on results from the literature
on mixed hazard rate models with proportionate unobserved heterogeneity.
Consider an inflow sample into the initial state open unemployment O. A person in the initial
state may exit to any of the three states (1) unemployment treated with short-term training S,
(2) unemployment treated with long-term training L, or (3) employment E. A person in state
17. Donald, Green, and Paarsch (2000) also use a hazard rate model to investigate differences between the US and
Canadian conditional wage distributions.
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Figure 1
Number of observations at different phases of the unemployment-employment cycle.
Notes: O,S,L,E denote the labor market states open unemployment, unemployment treated with short-term training,
unemployment treated with long-term training, and employment, respectively. The states in parentheses indicate
dependence of current states on the past trajectory. The first number in each box refers to the number of observations
using repeated cycles per person, the second number (in italics) to the number of observations using only the first cycle.
S may exit to the destinations L or E. A person in state L may move to state E.18 We call one
such sequence of transitions from unemployment to employment, a cycle. In the model with
employment duration as the second outcome, we also model the transition from employment, E,
back to open unemployment, O, and consider repeated cycles per individual. In the alternative
model with earnings as the second outcome, we use just the first cycle for every individual.19
Figure 1 illustrates the possible pathways from open unemployment to employment.
More formally, let K={O,S,L,E} denote the state space. The function Z(k) assigns to each
origin state k ∈K a set of possible destination states:
Z(k)=
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{S,L,E} if k =O
{L,E} if k =S
{E} if k =L
{O} if k =E .
For k ∈{O,S}, the number of elements in Z(k) is greater than one, |Z(k)|>1. Thus, we view a
cycle as a sequence of competing risks and single risk models.
According to the Markov assumption, the probability to experience a transition from
current state k to destination state l only depends on the current state k occupied. In order
to differentiate e.g., between employment spells following a participation in training as
opposed to open unemployment (cf. figure 1), we define the augmented state space Ka =
{O,S(O),L(O),E(O),L(S),E(S),E(S,L)}, where the states in parentheses indicate the past
18. If short-term training is the first intervention we allow for a second treatment with long-term training because
short-term training is also used to assess the professional skills of an unemployed and to define a suitable reintegration
plan, which may entail a later participation in a long-term training program.
19. Due to the reporting rules of the employment register we cannot model transitions into and out of employment
at the same time as earnings, see Section 4.2.
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trajectory. We denote the corresponding function of destination states from k ∈Ka by Za(k). We
model dependence on the past trajectory as lagged occurrence dependence and lagged duration
dependence. With this extension we can align treated and comparison persons with respect to
their unemployment experience since the beginning of the cycle. In particular, when estimating
training impacts on the transition rate to employment we align treated and comparison persons
in their total elapsed unemployment duration that is for the treated the prior duration in open
unemployment plus the current duration in treated unemployment. Similarly, when measuring
training impacts on the transition rate from employment back to unemployment we condition on
the total prior unemployment duration.
Let Tkl ∈R+ denote the random time spent in state k before exiting to state l, k ∈Ka, l∈Za(k)
and t the elapsed duration in state k. For origin states with multiple destinations we do not observe
the realizations of all exit times from state k but just that of the minimum. Let x(t) denote the
covariate process just before time t, x¯(t)≡{x(r),0≤r < t} the covariate path on [0,t) and X its
support. We can express the conditional distribution of Tkl, k ∈Ka, l∈Za(k)}, in terms of the
hazard rate:
θkl(t|τ,x¯(t),vkl)≡ limdt→0
Pr[t ≤Tkl < t+dt|Tkl ≥ t;τ,x¯(t),vkl]
dt
(3)
=λkl [t,1(k =O)τ,x(t)]vkl ,
where vkl ∈R+ is an unobserved heterogeneity term while λkl() : (R+×R+×X)→R+ denotes
the part of the hazard that is a function of observed factors, i.e., elapsed time in the current state t,
observed covariates x(t), and lagged duration τ that enters the transition rate if origin state k =O.
Our goal is to identify the single components of the hazard rates θkl() and the joint distribution
of the unobserved heterogeneity terms, G(v), v={vkl :k ∈Ka,l∈Za(k)}, which then yields the
joint distribution of the durations {Tkl :k ∈Ka,l∈Za(k)}. We proceed in a sequential way,
considering first identification of the competing risks from the initial state, then of the hazard
rates from the second state given the first transition and so on. In this way we identify, for a
given origin state k, the joint distribution of the unobservables {vkl : l∈Za(k)} together with the
selection process into state k. Once we have identified all possible trajectories leading from
open unemployment to employment, we can trace out the joint distribution of the unobservables
{vkl :k ∈Ka,l∈Za(k)} by varying the observed arguments of the hazard rates (i.e., t,τ,x(t)) on
a nonempty open set. This yields then the joint distribution of the survival times {Tkl :k ∈Ka,l∈
Za(k)}.
We describe the exact procedure and the identification results used at each stage of the
unemployment-employment cycle in Section A in the Supplementary Appendix. Here, we
summarize the main points. In our model with employment duration as the second outcome,
our identification strategy exploits that we observe about half of the sample more than once
in the initial state and that the hazard rates from treated unemployment and employment
include time-varying covariates.20 This allows us to avoid several restrictive assumptions, e.g.,
proportionality of the effects of elapsed duration, lagged duration, and observed covariates, which
are commonly made in the literature on mixed hazard rate models (Abbring and van den Berg,
20. In the hazard rates from unemployment we use time-varying regressors related to the remaining entitlement
period of unemployment benefits, age, and season of the year. In the hazard rates from treated unemployment, we include
in addition indicators for different time intervals relative to the planned end of the program. In the employment hazards,
we consider a polynomial of age (interacted with gender), indicators for season of the year and interactions between
season and industry of the last job.
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2003b, Proposition 3; Brinch, 2007). As suggested in equation (3), we only assume separability
of the unobserved heterogeneity terms.
In our alternative model with earnings, we model the conditional distribution of earnings
as a hazard rate together with the hazard rates from unemployment into employment, short-
term training, and long-term training. In this model, we do not have repeated cycles per person
and the hazard rates of daily earnings do not include covariates that vary with the level of
earnings. Therefore, we assume that the hazard rates are separable in their components, a flexible
nonnegative function of elapsed duration, λ0kl(t), of lagged duration, κkl(1(k =O)τ ), of observed
covariates, φkl(x(t)), and unobserved heterogeneity, vkl, i.e., θkl(t|τ,x¯(t),vkl)=λ0kl(t)κkl(1(k =
O)τ )φkl(x(t))vkl, and that the regressors are independent of the unobserved heterogeneity terms
(Abbring and van den Berg, 2003b, Proposition 2; Honoré, 1993, Theorem 3; Horny and Picchio,
2010).
3.3. Empirical support of the conditional no-anticipation and independence assumptions
The conditional no-anticipation assumption (1) and the conditional independence assumption
(2) are important prerequisites for identification. Analogously to a static matching analysis
their plausibility depends on the richness of our data and our ability to flexibly control for
potentially time-varying confounders that jointly determine outcome and treatment times. We can
to some extent dispense with time-constant observed covariates through including unobserved
heterogeneity. The combination of three factors makes the conditional no-anticipation assumption
a credible basis for causal analysis in our case: (1) our construction of the analysis sample, (2)
the institutional setup determining training participation, and (3) our flexible modeling strategy
based on large and informative data.
First, we construct our analysis sample in such a way that included individuals have similar
recent employment histories and high incentives to comply with the instructions of the caseworker.
According to the regulation of public employment services in Germany, job-seekers face tight
job search requirements (Section B.1 in the Supplementary Appendix). Therefore, we focus on
prime-age workers who experience a transition into unemployment after a period of continuous
employment. We refrain from including individuals who start looking for a job after a period
out of the labor force because they might only register at the local employment agency so
long as their expected utility from receiving particular services and programs exceeds their
disutility associated with tight job search requirements. As a consequence more than 90% of the
persons in our sample have substantial entitlements to unemployment benefits (Section D.3 in
the Supplementary Appendix). These individuals are presumably highly committed to cooperate
with the local employment agency, for intrinsic reasons as well as for the fact that in case of
noncompliance their generous benefits would be at risk. Overall, these sample selection criteria
ensure that the individuals considered in the analysis behave in a relatively predictable way and
according to the guidelines set out by public employment services.
Second, with respect to the assignment of training programs, a participation in training may
take place at any point in time during the unemployment spell. Job-seekers have no entitlements
regarding participation (Section B.1 in the Supplementary Appendix). However, a program
assignment is compulsory for the job-seeker and noncompliance may entail benefit sanctions
and the exclusion from further services. The allocation of training programs depends on the
short-term supply of training slots as well as private information of the caseworker. On the
one hand short notice periods and belated assignments (i.e., after the official starting date of
a program) are used as a work test. On the other hand they allow caseworkers to achieve a
high utilization of available training capacities and at the same time to avoid disincentives for
job-seekers anticipating future program participation. As caseworkers face a very high caseload
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the assignment is not targeted.21 As supporting evidence for this practice, we find considerable
variation in the timing of training starts during the unemployment spell and modest differences
in key observed characteristics between participants and nonparticipants (Sections D.2 and D.3
in the Supplementary Appendix). Anticipatory effects with regard to future training participation
are therefore unlikely to occur.
The third important ingredient for conditional no-anticipation and independence is the data
and the specification of the conditional hazard rates. Our administrative database is exceptionally
rich with regard to the number of observations as well as the available covariate information.
Large sample sizes allow us to condition on current and lagged duration, calendar time, observed
covariates, and unobserved heterogeneity in a detailed and flexible way (see also Section
4.3). For instance, we use step functions to model duration dependence, which allows us to
nonparametrically approximate arbitrary patterns of duration dependence. We model the impacts
of training on the exit rate out of unemployment with a step function indicating different time
intervals relative to the planned end of the program. In addition, we flexibly condition on
calendar time at the start of the spell, current season of the year, and age of the individual. A
careful specification of duration and calendar time effects is important to capture changes in the
job-seeker’s information set that are a function of time.
In terms of covariates, we have access to the information collected on job-seekers when
they register at the local employment agency, i.e., the Supply of Applicants database. It builds
the basis for the counseling activities and assignment decisions of the caseworker. It details
personal characteristics, properties of the last job, and objectives of job-search. The data also
include caseworker assessments of the qualifications and experience of a job-seeker and of
his/her health status. Combining this with the employment register we can characterize the last
employment relationship in terms of e.g. previous earnings, occupation, industry, type of position,
and the reason why the job ended. In addition, we control for region of residence and local labor
market conditions. We include time-varying indicators for the remaining benefit entitlement, past
and current periods of sickness as well as past and current temporary suspensions of benefit
payments.22
4. IMPLEMENTATION
4.1. Training programs analyzed
Training schemes are the core of active labor market policy in Germany as in most advanced
countries.23 In our analysis, we focus on human capital intensive long-term training on the one
hand and job search-oriented short-term training on the other hand.
Long-term training schemes comprise a variety of programs ranging from advanced vocational
training and refresher courses on specific professional skills and operational techniques to
comprehensive retraining in a new vocational degree within the German apprenticeship system.
The former typically last between six and twelve months whereas retraining takes two to three
years. Training programs may take place either in classrooms, simulated workplaces, firms,
or a combination thereof. Typical examples of long-term training programs include training on
21. The average caseload in terms of registered unemployed is about 400 unemployed per caseworker (Section
B.1 in the Supplementary Appendix). In addition, caseworkers counsel people who register as job-seekers but are not
unemployed as well as people who do not register in the end.
22. See Section E in the Supplementary Appendix for a detailed description of the included variables.
23. See Section B.2 in the Supplementary Appendix for further information on the quantitative importance of
training in the context of German active labor market policy.
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marketing and sales strategies, computer-assisted bookkeeping, operating construction machines,
and specialist courses in specific legal fields.
Short-term training courses last a couple of days to twelve weeks. Similar to the long-term
training schemes, they may take place in classrooms or workplace-like environments. However,
due to their shorter length their contents are less occupation specific and the human capital
component is limited. Typical examples of short-term training schemes include job application
training, basic computer courses, language courses, and short-term internships at a simulated
or real workplace. Their aim is twofold. On the one hand, they provide skills that improve and
facilitate job search. On the other hand, they are employed to assess a job-seeker’s abilities and
his/her readiness to work or to participate in a further program.
4.2. Data
The empirical analysis is based on an exceptionally rich administrative database, the Integrated
Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS) that has recently been made available by the Research
Data Center of the German Federal Employment Agency. The IEBS is a 2.2% random sample
from a merged data file containing individual records out of four different administrative registers.
It comprises data on employment subject to social security contributions, receipt of transfer
payments during unemployment, job search, and participation in different active labor market
programs. Start and end dates of the different labor market episodes are measured with daily
precision.
From this data set, we extract a sample of West Germans aged twenty-five to fifty-three years
who experience a transition from regular, unsubsidized employment lasting three months or longer
to unemployment within the period July 1999 to December 2001. Unemployment is defined as
nonemployment with at least occasional contact with the employment agency. This contact may
be recorded in the data either as a benefit spell, a registered job search spell, or a period of program
participation.24 Unemployment spells are censored at the end date of the last contact with the
employment agency if in the following three months no such contact persists. Nonemployment
spells without any contact with the employment office are not considered because in that case
we cannot distinguish between people looking for a job and persons out of the labor force.
Also, people who are not actively looking for a job or who do not register with the employment
agency are not eligible for training programs. Transitions to active labor market programs other
than training are treated as independent censoring. We follow the persons in the inflow sample
until the end of December 2004, and ongoing spells are censored at that date. We model the
trajectory from open unemployment to employment, which may include a participation short-
term training or long-term training. In addition, we consider the transition from employment back
to unemployment. Individuals in the sample may have multiple unemployment and employment
spells if they experience multiple transitions between unemployment and employment.
In the alternative model with earnings, we model the pathway from open unemployment
to employment and the average earnings per calendar day within the first 365 days upon
reemployment. Days during which a person is not employed contribute with a zero. Earnings
are censored at the social security threshold and if the time between the end of unemployment
and the end of our observation period is less than 365 days. In the model with earnings, we use
only the first cycle for every individual because we cannot measure earnings dynamics at the
same frequency as employment dynamics. Total earnings are reported only once every calendar
24. For 12 out of 13,859 training spells, the training spell constitutes the first contact with the employment agency
recorded in the data.
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TABLE 1
Unemployment and employment outcomes by treatment status
Unemployment Employment Earnings
E(T |T ≤1825) Median E(T |T ≤1825) Median E(T |T ≤144) Median
No training 219 160 375 284 49.87 49.25
Short training 235 172 361 304 45.08 43.29
Long training 570 607 477 506 50.16 50.13
All 261 167 380 287 49.56 48.87
Observations 87,250 56,758 30,190
Unemployment and employment durations are measured in days, daily earnings inE (real values, reference year 2000).
year in employment relationships that last longer than a year. We model the conditional density
of daily earnings in the same way as the transition rates into different labor market states, i.e.,
using a mixed proportional hazard rate specification.
Figure 1 above illustrates the different transitions of the 45,459 people in our sample. In total,
there are 87,250 unemployment spells, of which 8,279 (5,580) lead to a participation in short-
term training (long-term training), and there are 56,758 employment spells. About half of the
individuals in the sample experience multiple unemployment spells and about 30% have more
than one employment spell. In contrast, only 8% (2%) of the treated with short-term training
(long-term training) participate more than once in the same program.
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the distributions of unemployment and employment
durations as well as wages, by treatment status and for the entire sample. The means in Table 1
refer to the expected value conditional on the truncated distribution of T until truncation point
t¯ >0.25 It is calculated as follows:
E[T |T ≤ t¯]=
∫ t¯
0 rdF(r)
F(t¯) =
∫ t¯
0 S(r)dr− t¯S(t¯)
1−S(t¯) , (4)
where F(t) is the cumulative distribution function and S(t) the survivor function. We estimate
S(t) with the Kaplan and Meier (1958) estimator. In sum, the evidence in Table 1 suggests that
long-term training has beneficial effects on employment duration but at the same time seems
to strongly increase unemployment duration. Short-term training, in contrast, tends to reduce
unemployment duration but seems to have mixed effects on employment and earnings. However,
it is important to stress that these patterns reflect a mixture of causal and selection effects. It
remains to be seen to what extent they persist after taking into account the dynamic selection into
treatments and into outcome states.26
4.3. Model specification
We adopt a piecewise constant exponential model for the hazard rates. For the index functions, we
use flexible, linear in parameters specifications to model the dependence on observed covariates
x(t) and lagged duration τ . We use piecewise constant specifications to model the dependence on
25. We choose the truncation points for unemployment and employment duration according to the limits of our
observation period and for daily earnings according to the social security threshold in 2000.
26. Sections C, D, and E in the Supplementary Appendix provide further details on the administrative data base,
additional descriptive evidence and a complete list of the covariates used in the estimations.
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elapsed duration t and time dependence of training impacts during unemployment. Specifically,
in our model with employment, the hazard rate for the transition from state k to l is given by:
θkl(t|τ,x(t),vkl)=λkl [t,1(k =O)τ,x(t)]vkl
=exp[hkl(t,1(k =O)τ,x(t))βkl]vkl ,
where hkl() is a function of the observed components elapsed time t, lagged duration τ (that enters
the hazard rate if state k =O) and observed covariates x(t), and βkl is a conformable coefficient
vector. In our alternative model with earnings, the hazard rate for the transition from state k to l is
modeled as θkl(t|τ,x(t),vkl)=exp[bkl(t)γkl +dkl(1(k =O)τ )δkl +fkl(x(t))ζkl]vkl, with b(), d(),
f () some flexible functions and γ , δ, ζ conformable coefficient vectors.
We model the joint distribution of the unobservables, {vkl :k ∈Ka, l∈Za(k)}, with a discrete
masspoint distribution that in principle allows to approximate any arbitrary discrete or continuous
distribution (Heckman and Singer, 1984). In particular, we adopt a factor loading specification
with two independent underlying factors, w1 and w2:
vkl =exp(αkl1w1+αkl2w2), k ∈Ka,l∈Za(k)},
where αkl1 and αkl2 denote the factor loadings on the fundamental unobserved factors w1 and
w2, respectively, for a transition from state k to l. We normalize w1 and w2 to have support
{−1,1} and in addition constrain one of the αkl2 to equal zero.27 The two-dimensional factor
loading model imposes no restrictions on the covariance matrix of the unobserved heterogeneity
terms. Let w= (w1,w2)′ and A be the matrix of factor loadings with rows Akl = (αkl1,αkl2),
k ∈Ka,l∈Za(k)}. Then the variance–covariance matrix of the unobserved heterogeneity terms
is given by Var(ln(v))=AVar(w)A′.
In our preferred specifications, each of the two factors has two masspoints. We experimented
with different numbers of masspoints for the latent factors. The maximum number that led to a
significant improvement of the log likelihood function was three masspoints for each factor in
the model with employment duration. However, the model fit in terms of a comparison between
the original and simulated duration distributions differed only marginally from that based on
two masspoints for each factor. Importantly, the model with two masspoints for each factor is
computationally more attractive. Since we normalize the locations of the masspoints we can avoid
evaluation of their derivatives. This speeds up computation by a factor of two to four, which is
important when it comes to bootstrapping standard errors.
4.4. Estimation
Conditional on the observed covariates and the unobserved determinants, the joint density of the
four durations for individual i is given by:
fi =
Ni∏
j=1
Pij∏
p=1
θp(tijp|τijp,xij(tijp),vip)cijp exp[−
∫ tijp
0
θp(r|τijp,xij(r),vip)dr],
where Ni is the number of cycles of person i, Pij is the total number of possible origin destination
state pairs associated with person i’s j-th cycle, and cijp is a censoring indicator that equals one
27. All hazards contain an intercept.
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if the observation period of person i in cycle j ends with a transition from the origin state to
the destination state indexed by p. θp() is the hazard rate that depends on elapsed duration in
the current state t, lagged duration τ , observed covariates x(t), and unobserved heterogeneity v.
Since we allow for nonzero correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms in the different
hazard rates, the likelihood function is not separable by individual and spell type. Thus, the
individual likelihood contribution conditional on observed covariates and integrated over the
vector of unobserved heterogeneity terms, v, is:
Li =
∫
···
∫ Ni∏
j=1
Pij∏
p=1
θp(tijp|τijp,xij(tijp),vip)cijp×
exp
[
−
∫ tijp
0
θp(r|τijp,xij(r),vip)dr
]
dG(v).
The final models involve the estimation of more than 350 and 500 parameters, respectively.
The maximization routine uses a Newton-Raphson algorithm with analytic first and second
derivatives.28 To obtain standard errors, we implement the semi-parametric bootstrap procedure
suggested in Gaure, Røed, van den Berg and Zhang (2010). For the coefficients on the observed
covariates we draw values from their joint normal distribution.29 Based on these draws we estimate
a constrained model keeping the coefficients on the observed covariates fixed and maximizing
over the coefficients associated with the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. We perform 250
bootstrap replications.30 The full estimation results and the simulated model fit are displayed in
Sections F and G in the Supplementary Appendix.
5. CAUSAL ESTIMATES OF TRAINING IMPACTS
5.1. Impacts of training on the treated
We use the parameter estimates to simulate the marginal distributions of treatment and
nontreatment outcomes in the sample of treated persons. In particular, we consider all persons
who receive training within the first 731 days of their first unemployment spell.31 We exclude later
training starts in order to avoid extrapolations beyond the time horizon of our data. We simulate
ten unemployment-employment cycles for each person and treatment status.32 From the simulated
durations, we estimate the marginal distributions of treatment and nontreatment outcomes with
the Kaplan and Meier (1958) estimator. We further assess training impacts through contrasting
summary statistics of the marginal distributions, e.g. the truncated mean given in equation (4).
We compute standard errors for the summary statistics by rerunning the simulation procedure
250 times using the parameter values from the bootstrap replications.33
28. The maximum likelihood evaluator is implemented in Stata MP Version 11.1 and its matrix language Mata.
29. Van der Vaart (1996) shows that, in the exponential hazard model with nonparametric unobserved heterogeneity,
the coefficients attached to observed covariates are asymptotically normal.
30. We use the bootstrap distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters to test them for normality. The
tests suggest no deviation from normality for 16 out of 17 parameters in model 1 (employment) and 7–9 parameters out
of 13 in model 2 (earnings as second outcome).
31. We obtain a subsample 7,046 of treated persons, 3,489 of which participate in short-term training, and 3,557 in
long-term training.
32. Further details are provided in Section H in the Supplementary Appendix.
33. As the summary statistics on training impacts are smooth functionals of the survivor function we treat them as
normal distributed when conducting hypothesis tests.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2
Impacts of training on the hazard rate out of unemployment.
Notes: Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the hazard rates are based on simulated unemployment durations with and
without training for a subset of the originally treated persons. The bandwidth for the kernel smooth of the hazard rates is
30 days. Estimates within 30 days of the left boundary are omitted.
Our data includes information on the planned and actually realized end dates of training
programs. The planned enrolment length is assigned at the start of the program and may be
shorter or longer than the realized duration.34 We model duration dependence of treatment effects
with dummy variables indicating different time intervals relative to the planned program end.
This allows us to contrast in-program effects with postprogram effects of training. Thus, we
consider two measures for the impact of training on unemployment: the effect on the remaining
time counted from the start of training and from the planned end of training. Figure 2a and b
depict the simulated hazard rates with and without training from the program start onwards, figure
2c and d show the hazard rates starting from the planned program end.
Figure 2a shows that participants in short-term training exit at a faster rate, compared with
the situation without training, already from the beginning of the program onwards. Thus, a
participation in short-term training, that has a median planned duration of four weeks, has no
noticeable lock-in effect. To the contrary, it immediately helps participants in getting reemployed.
The effect reaches its maximum about 65 days after the program start. At that date, the hazard
rate with short-term training is 18% higher than that without training. However, it then fades
away relatively quickly. According to figure 2c, the difference between the hazard rates with and
without training is already very small three months after the planned program end.
34. Waller (2009) reports that about 20% of the persons who attend a training program for more than one week
drop out early, i.e., before completing 80% of the scheduled enrolment length.
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TABLE 2
Nontreatment outcomes (NTO) and treatment effects on the treated (TT) for remaining unemployment duration
Remaining time in unemployment from program start
E(T |T ≤731) Pr(T >731) P15 P30 P45
Short-term training
NTO 191.39 (2.20) 0.39 (0.01) 54 (1.44) 122 (4.01) 264 (11.39)
TT –16.37 (4.02)∗∗∗ –0.04 (0.02)∗ –7 (2.83)∗∗ –21 (6.99)∗∗∗ –59 (21.02)∗∗∗
Long-term training
NTO 187.68 (1.81) 0.35 (0.01) 46 (1.24) 106 (2.92) 225 (8.52)
TT 95.01 (4.19)∗∗∗ 0.08 (0.03)∗∗∗ 97 (8.61)∗∗∗ 154 (15.19)∗∗∗ 211 (37.66)∗∗∗
Remaining time in unemployment from planned program end
E(T |T ≤365) Pr(T >365) P15 P30 P45
Short-term training
NTO 121.54 (0.84) 0.53 (0.01) 55 (1.52) 135 (4.65) 320 (14.00)
TT –10.84 (1.57)∗∗∗ –0.06 (0.02)∗∗∗ –23 (3.12)∗∗∗ –35 (8.81)∗∗∗ –94 (24.89)∗∗∗
Long-term training
NTO 143.64 (1.41) 0.69 (0.01) 118 (4.29) 332 (13.37) —
TT –24.54 (2.97)∗∗∗ –0.17 (0.03)∗∗∗ –69 (6.13)∗∗∗ –201 (19.35)∗∗∗ —
Unemployment durations are measured in days. P15, P30, P45 refer to the percentiles of the cumulative distribution
function. Calculations are based on simulated unemployment durations with and without training for a subset of the
originally treated persons. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
The picture is rather different for long-term training programs that have a median planned
duration of 201 days. In figure 2b, we see that, during participation, people exit unemployment
at a much lower rate compared with the situation of nonparticipation. Only after about more than
200 days since program start, when the majority has completed training, the hazard rate recovers
to a level slightly exceeding the one without participation. However, once we concentrate on
the period following the scheduled program end, in figure 2d, we see that long-term training has
strong and persistent positive effects on the exit rate to employment. During the first three months
after the planned program end, the hazard rate out of unemployment is about twice as high for
the participants compared with the situation had they not participated. This effect slowly declines
over time. One year after the planned program end, the hazard rate with participation in long-term
training is about 40% higher than without training.
Table 2 provides summary statistics and bootstrapped standard errors on the impacts of short-
and long-term training on the remaining time in unemployment. In each table, the row labeled
“NTO” refers to the simulated nontreatment outcome and the row labeled “TT” to the simulated
treatment effect on the treated. The columns labeled “E[T |T ≤731]” and “E[T |T ≤365]” refer
to the truncated means that are calculated according to equation (4), now for the remaining
time in unemployment until 731 days after the start of training and 365 days after the planned
end, respectively. Counting from the program start, we see that short-term training reduces the
expected remaining time in unemployment by a statistically significant sixteen days, about 8.6%,
whereas participating in long-term training significantly increases it by ninety-five days or 50.6%.
Considering the time from the planned program end onwards, we see that long-term training
has a stronger beneficial effect than short-term training: the latter reduces the average remaining
duration in unemployment by eleven days (9.0%), whereas the reduction achieved with long-term
training is twenty-five days (17.4%).
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(a) (b)
Figure 3
Impacts of training on the probability of survival in employment,
Notes: Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the probability to remain employed are based on simulated employment
durations with and without training for a subset of the originally treated persons.
Figure 3 displays the simulated impacts of training on the probability to stay employed beyond
a given elapsed duration. For both training programs the probability to remain employed is
higher with training than without at longer elapsed durations. The vertical difference between
the survivors with and without training increases up to about 1.5 years after the beginning of
the employment spell and remains constant thereafter. When the vertical difference stabilizes,
the effect of long-term training is about twice as large as that of short-term training. Thus, long-
term training increases the stability of employment much more strongly than short-term training.
Taking the horizontal difference between the survivor functions with and without training in each
graph we obtain the quantile treatment effect. Figure 3 shows that the quantile treatment effects
are increasing with decreasing percentiles of the survivor functions. The substantial heterogeneity
of the quantile treatment effects suggests that there is also a considerable heterogeneity in the
distribution of individual treatment effects.35
Table 3 translates the rather qualitative findings obtained from figure 3 into summary statistics
and provides bootstrapped standard errors. The impact of short-term training on the expected
employment duration (truncation point is 1,825 days) is seven days, 1.4%, and insignificant.
The effect of long-term training on the mean employment duration is with twenty-three days or
5% somewhat bigger but still insignificant. However, at the median and the 70th percentile the
horizontal distance between the cumulative distribution functions with and without long-term
training is much larger and increasing. Similarly, the probability of survival in employment five
years after the start of the spell is 9 percentage points or 45% higher with long-term training
compared with the situation without. The corresponding number for short-term training is 5
percentage points, a bit less than 30%. Twenty-nine percent of the survival times in employment
associated with long-term training exceed 1,825 days compared with 22% of those with short-
term training. This suggests, that the truncated mean underestimates in particular the effect of
long-term training on the subsequent employment duration.
Table 4 shows the impacts of training on average daily earnings during the first year after
reemployment. Short-term training has no effect on earnings. The point estimate is almost zero
and not significant statistically. Contrary to the descriptive findings, long-term training leads to
significant earnings gains of E3.37 or 7% a day. These estimates likely underestimate the full
35. See Heckman, Smith, and Clements (1997) for a discussion of properties of the distribution of individual
treatment effects that can be inferred from the marginal distributions of treatment and nontreatment outcomes.
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TABLE 3
Nontreatment outcomes (NTO) and treatment effects on the treated (TT) for employment duration
E(T |T ≤1825) Pr(T >1825) P30 P50 P70
Short-term training
NTO 435.57 (9.07) 0.17 (0.01) 207 (4.72) 330 (7.20) 869 (38.67)
TT 6.99 (14.31) 0.05 (0.02)∗∗∗ 11 (11.22) 48 (40.20) 279 (129.57)∗∗
Long-term training
NTO 445.96 (7.17) 0.20 (0.01) 216 (4.03) 354 (8.50) 1050 (47.70)
TT 22.71 (16.61) 0.09 (0.03)∗∗∗ 35 (15.20)∗∗ 215 (92.31)∗∗ 682 (176.65)∗∗∗
Employment duration is measured in days. P30, P50, P70 refer to the percentiles of the cumulative distribution function.
Calculations are based on simulated employment durations with and without training for a subset of the originally treated
persons. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the
10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
TABLE 4
Nontreatment outcomes (NTO) and treatment effects on the treated (TT) for daily earnings
E(T |T ≤144) Pr(T >144) P25 P50 P75
Short-term training
NTO 46.29 (0.83) 0.015 (0.001) 26.22 (0.66) 45.54 (1.06) 63.55 (1.03)
TT –0.05 (0.58) –0.003 (0.001)∗∗∗ 0.20 (0.45) –0.06 (0.72) –0.62 (0.70)
Long-term training
NTO 47.02 (0.88) 0.014 (0.001) 26.58 (0.70) 46.67 (1.12) 64.67 (1.12)
TT 3.37 (1.48)∗∗ 0.001 (0.003) 3.59 (1.33)∗∗∗ 4.58 (1.69)∗∗∗ 3.56 (2.05)∗
Earnings per calendar day are measured inE (real values, reference year 2000). P25, P50, P75 refer to the percentiles of
the cumulative distribution function. Calculations are based on simulated earnings with and without training for a subset
of the originally treated persons. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
monetary return to training as our earnings measure refers to the first year after reemployment
only. In fact, our findings for employment stability suggest that especially persons treated with
long-term training accumulate more work experience than without training over the longer run.
This may lead to additional earnings gains in the medium and long run.36
5.2. Importance of the timing of training
We model the time dependence of treatment effects as proportional shifts of the hazard rate
out of unemployment that vary with time relative to the planned program end. In addition, we
include a linear and a quadratic term of the log unemployment duration at program start in
the hazard rate. This specification allows for complex effects of the timing of training during
the unemployment spell. In order to assess the ceteris paribus effect of changing the starting
date of training during unemployment, we predict the truncated mean unemployment duration
associated with different starting dates for a reference person with characteristics at the mean
or mode of each covariate. Specifically, this person is a male German aged thiry-eight years
36. To get an idea of the persistence of training impacts in later unemployment and employment spells, we include
indicators for lagged training participation. Overall, the estimates indicate some persistence across spells. However,
positive effects on employment stability tend to be offset by negative effects on unemployment duration.
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(a) (b)
Figure 4
Training impacts on unemployment duration by starting date.
Notes: Calculations are based on the predicted means measured from the start of the spell (a) and from the start of
training (b), respectively, for a reference person, cf. Section 5.2. The truncated means are calculated according to
equation (4). The truncation point is 1,825 days in the left panel and 731 days in the right. The gray lines are 95%
confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors with 250 replications.
at the start of the spell, married without children, living in the German federal state of North
Rhine-Westphalia, holding a secondary schooling degree reached at the end of the 10th grade
(Realschule) and a vocational training degree, previously employed as a bluecollar craftsman in
the trade and transport sector, with log daily earnings of 3.9 (i.e. in the third quartile), entitled to
340 days of unemployment benefits, considered as having relevant vocational qualification and
experience by the caseworker, and starting his unemployment spell in the first quarter of 2000.37
The planned program durations are set to their medians at twenty-six (short-term training) and
201 days (long-term training), respectively. The unobserved heterogeneity terms are set to their
mean values.
Figure 4a shows the impact of the timing of training on the truncated expected unemployment
duration measured from the start of unemployment until Day 1,825 and the right panel shows
the impact on the truncated expected remaining unemployment duration measured from the start
of training until Day 731 after training start.38 It suggests that, in absolute value, the impact of
both short-term and long-term training on the total unemployment duration is strongest when
training is started early during unemployment, but with opposite signs. A participation in long-
term training starting during the first three months of unemployment increases the total expected
time in unemployment by up to 151 days, whereas a participation in short-term training in the
same period decreases the total expected time in unemployment by up to 43 days. With increasing
elapsed unemployment duration at program start the impacts of both training programs on the
total expected unemployment duration decrease in absolute value. The effect of long-term training
converges to +16 days, whereas that of short-term training approaches to zero as the time in
unemployment at program start increases.
Figure 4b displays the impact of the timing of training on the remaining time in unemployment
counted from the start of the program. The impact of short-term training is largely constant at
37. The original estimation includes time-varying dummies indicating different seasons of the year. In the simulation,
we assign each of these variables a time-constant value representing their share in a given calendar year. This way we
obtain expected outcome durations that are seasonally adjusted.
38. The truncated expectations are calculated according to equation (4).
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about −40 days regardless of the starting date during unemployment. In contrast, the impact of
long-term training on the remaining time in unemployment displays a declining pattern, from
about +115 days for program starts during the first three months to +60 days for program starts
in the eighth quarter after the beginning of unemployment. The different patterns in figure 4a and
b reflect that longer survival times are weighted differently in the two graphs. While the expected
value from the start of training (figure 4b) conditions on survival in unemployment until program
start, the expected value from the start of unemployment (figure 4a) accounts for the possibility
that the unemployment spell may terminate before the start of training. Therefore, in figure 4a,
training impacts at later points in time during unemployment receive a lower weight than training
impacts occurring at the start of unemployment. This difference in weighting largely drives the
apparently diminishing effectiveness of short-term training in figure 4a, while the analog does
not hold for long-term training. In fact, our findings suggest that long-term training programs
starting later during unemployment lead to a considerably smaller increase in unemployment
duration.
5.3. Effect heterogeneity across observed characteristics
Our estimated models flexibly account for heterogeneous treatment effects across observed and
unobserved variables. To examine the differences across observed characteristics, we aggregate
the simulated treatment and nontreatment outcomes in a given subgroup, e.g., men, and calculate
the treatment effect in this subgroup. The entries in tables 5 and 6 show the program impact on the
treated for the subgroup given in the row label. The treatment effects refer to the truncated means
for the outcomes remaining time in unemployment from program start and planned program end
as well as daily earnings. The truncation points are 731 days, 365 days, andE144, respectively. For
the outcome employment duration, we present results on the quantile treatment effect evaluated
at the median and on the probability to remain employed after 1,825 days. The last row for each
set of subgroups provides the p-value of a Wald test that the treatment effects are equal across
subgroups.39
Several interesting differences across groups emerge. Female participants in long-term
training tend to benefit more than males, whereas no consistent gender differences exist for
short-term training. Long-term training increases the remaining time in unemployment measured
from the program start by 87 days (44.6%) for women and 102 days (56.8%) for men. Female
participants in long-term training achieve higher employment gains of 291 days (64.8%) at the
median and earnings gains ofE4.37 (10.4%) on average per calendar day as opposed to 115 days
(36.7%) and E2.69 (5.2%), respectively, for males. For older workers aged forty-five years and
above, short-term training tends to work less well than for the younger age groups. However,
the null hypothesis of equal of treatment effects across age groups cannot be rejected for any
of the impact measures at conventional significance levels. Comparing the results for foreign
nationals to those of Germans participating in long-term training, we find very small effects on
employment duration for foreign people but large effects for Germans (e.g., a quantile treatment
effect of +312 days, 84.7%). However, foreign nationals participating in long-term training exhibit
higher earnings gains ofE4.83 (11.1%) on average per calendar day as opposed toE2.80 (5.8%).
High-skilled participants in long-term training holding a university degree or previously
working as senior officials, managers and professionals exhibit very strong lock-in effects, i.e.,
a 107–140 days (around 60%) increase in the remaining unemployment duration measured from
39. As an alternative, in Section I in the Supplementary Appendix, we provide evidence from hypothesis tests
that indicate whether the proportionate treatment effect on the hazard rate is different for a particular subgroup keeping
everything else constant.
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the program start. For participants in long-term training previously working in low- to medium-
skilled occupations the corresponding figure lies between +90 and +100 days (around 50%).
Persons with low formal qualifications as well as persons previously working in elementary
occupations exhibit small employment gains: at the median the effect is +49 days (16.2%) for
low skilled and +60 days (20.1%) for elementary occupations, respectively. In contrast, people
with medium formal qualifications and people previously working in medium-skilled job that are
intensive in analytic and interactive tasks show very strong employment gains. Technicians and
associate professionals, for instance, gain 432 employment days (89.8%) at the median and have
a 16.6 percentage points (69.3%) higher probability to remain employed after five years. High
skilled and persons in high-skilled occupations also show big point estimates for employment
duration, but the standard errors tend to be large as well.
When it comes to earnings impacts of long-term training the ordering tends to be reversed.
Persons with low formal education and persons previously working in low- and medium-skilled
manual jobs (in particular, elementary occupations and service workers) reap the highest earnings
gains of E4.12, E5.53, and E6.80, respectively. In relative terms, these earnings gains are
in the order of 10.3, 15.1, and 18.9%, respectively, a substantial amount from an economic
point of view. Senior officials and managers, experience an earnings gain of E8.60 per calendar
day, which corresponds to a gain of 11.9% in relative terms. The earnings gains for persons
holding a university degree as well as for people previously working in high- and medium-skilled
occupations that are intensive in analytic and interactive tasks, in contrast, are small (between
E0.33 and E1.85).
The differing impacts of long-term training across occupation groups may also contribute to
explaining the differences across gender. In our sample, 36.8% of female job-seekers previously
worked as clerk or technician and associate professional as opposed to only 18.1% of the males.
These occupations reap the highest employment gains. 23.9% of the women as opposed to 7.5% of
the men previously worked as service workers, a group with above average earnings gains. Forty-
nine percent of the male unemployed previously worked in production occupations (plant/machine
operator or craft and related occupations) that show below average employment gains from long-
term training. However, the earnings gains for these occupations tend to be above average.
Similarly, the smaller employment and higher earnings effects for foreign nationals as opposed
to Germans participating in long-term training may be associated with their higher shares in
elementary and production occupations.
As regards short-term training, the group of technicians and associate professionals exhibits
exceptionally high benefits in terms of employment stability with a quantile treatment effect
of +129 days (25.5%). For the other occupation groups the quantile treatment effects for
employment duration are smaller. However, we find sizeable impacts of 5–8 percentage points on
the probability to be still employed after five years for five out of nine occupation groups. Overall,
the differences across skill and occupation groups do not suggest a coherent interpretation.
In sum, these patterns suggest that long-term training programs facilitate the occupational
advancement of heterogeneous groups of participants. However, their beneficial effects manifest
in different ways across different groups. While they have large positive effects on employment
stability for people in medium- to high-skilled analytic and interactive jobs, there are almost no
employment effects for people in low- to medium-skilled service and production occupations.
However, the latter groups show above average earnings gains, whereas the former earn hardly
more than without training. The often sizeable employment and earnings gains come at the cost
of prolonged unemployment spells. The opportunity cost of participating in long-term training is
highest for people holding a university degree as well as for senior officials and managers. Short-
term training programs do not harm any of the groups considered but their beneficial effects are
generally limited in magnitude.
[14:04 22/1/2013 rds022.tex] RESTUD: The Review of Economic Studies Page: 339 313–342
OSIKOMINU THE DYNAMIC EFFECTS OF TRAINING 339
5.4. Cost-benefit assessment
From a policy point of view it is important to know whether the gains of participating in short-term
or long-term training outweigh the costs. In order to get an idea of the cost-effectiveness of the
programs consider the following back-of-the-envelop calculations. A short-term training course
costs on averageE560 and a long-term training courseE5,850 (cf. Table B1 in the Supplementary
Appendix). The employment agency pays on average E1,050 per month for an unemployed
entitled to unemployment benefits. Extrapolating beyond the limits imposed by our data we can
calculate the impacts of training on the nontruncated means of unemployment and employment
duration as well as earnings as averages across our sample of treated persons.40 A participation in
short-term training reduces the expected unemployment duration by 53 days (–7.5%), increases
the expected employment duration by 162 days (+19.1%) and reduces average daily earnings
by E–0.46 (–1.0%). Long-term training increases unemployment duration by ninty-seven days
(+15.7%), employment duration by 330 days (+34.9%) and daily earnings by E3.50 (+7.2%).
These calculations indicate that short-term training is likely cost effective, both from the
taxpayer’s and the participant’s perspective. It reduces unemployment duration and the associated
transfer payments by aboutE1,850. These savings in transfer payments exceed the course fees by
a factor of three. In addition, short-term training positively affects the expected time in subsequent
employment. In contrast, the picture is less clear for long-term training. With the additional benefit
payments arising during the extra time in unemployment, a long-term training course causes about
E9,000 of additional costs for the taxpayer compared with the situation of nonparticipation. Yet in
view of the substantial positive effects on employment duration and the moderate earnings gains,
it might be possible that in the long run also long-term training pays off from a fiscal point of view.
As the benefits in terms of reduced unemployment insurance payments and higher tax revenues
accumulate over time they may eventually exceed the initial investment of E9,000. Further,
from the perspective of the participant, long-term training programs well seem to be attractive
on average. Indeed, while unemployed participants receive relatively generous unemployment
benefits. Once they have completed their long-term training course, on average, they quickly
take up a job that is more stable and pays more than without training. A full assessment of
the cost-effectiveness of both training programs according to a social cost-benefit criterion that
considers the costs and benefits that accrue to taxpayers and participants alike, would require
further assumptions and information, e.g., on discount rates and tax scales.
6. CONCLUSION
This study investigates and compares the dynamic causal effects of short-term, job search-oriented
training and long-term, human capital intensive training schemes. Our empirical analysis uses rich
administrative data for Germany, where both program types are used at the same time. We examine
and compare the separate effects of both programs on unemployment and employment spells as
well as daily earnings, taking into account the heterogeneity of training impacts according to the
timing of participation during unemployment as well as across different subgroups of participants.
We find that participating in short-term training reduces the remaining time in unemployment
and has moderate positive effects on subsequent job stability. Long-term training programs
initially prolong the remaining time in unemployment, but once the scheduled program end
40. We compute the (nontruncated) expected treatment and nontreatment outcomes as follows: E[T ]=∫ t¯0 S(r)dr+
S(t¯)/θ (t¯), with S(t) the survivor function and θ (t) the hazard rate at T = t. This means, we extrapolate beyond truncation
point t¯ assuming a constant hazard rate equal to the hazard rate at t¯. We set t¯ to 1,460 days for unemployment duration,
1,825 days for employment duration, andE144 for daily earnings.
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is reached participants exit to employment at a much faster rate than without training. Moreover,
participants in long-term training benefit from substantially more stable employment spells and
higher earnings.
Importantly, our findings point to the possibility of improving the efficiency of long-term
training programs through a careful targeting. Specifically, we find that the opportunity cost of
participating in terms of prolonged unemployment is lower for people with lower chances to exit
unemployment on their own, e.g. long-term unemployed and low skilled. Persons without formal
education degree and persons previously working in low- and medium-skilled manual occupations
reap particularly high benefits with respect to earnings. Persons previously working in medium-
skilled analytic and interactive occupations achieve substantial gains in terms of employment
stability. Thus, long-term training programs seem well effective in supporting the occupational
advancement of very heterogeneous groups of people, including those with generally weak labor
market prospects. However, from a more narrow, fiscal perspective only the low-cost short-term
training schemes are on average cost efficient in the short run.41 In light of the recent policy
shifts favoring short, job search-oriented training programs a more balanced use of both types of
training seems warranted. In fact, while the shorter programs may appeal for their cost efficiency
the longer programs seem more effective in tackling structural deficits.
From a conceptual point of view, our study highlights that time is an important dimension
of program evaluation not appropriately accounted for in conventional static and experimental
research designs. A detailed analysis of the dynamics of program assignment and labor market
outcomes, considering also impact heterogeneity allows a deeper understanding of how programs
work. This knowledge is important for an optimal use of public employment services.
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